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Ground Control Stations 
UAS Human Factors 
• Reduced sensory cues 
• Latency 
• Lost link 
• Control transfers 
• Traffic separation 
• Long duration flights 
• Flight termination 
• Control station design 
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NASA’s UAS Activities 
• Operations 
– Ikhana, Global Hawk, Sierra, …  
• Research 
– UAS in the NAS Project 
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Learning from Incidents 
• In the 20th century, aviation accidents and 
incidents led to system improvements 
– e.g., checklists, improved training, fatigue 
management, improved cockpit design 
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The Problem 
• Lack of data on UAS incidents 
• Commercial operations tightly restricted 
• Relatively few UAS reports have been submitted 
to ASRS by UAS pilots 
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Critical Incident Technique 
• In 1940’s, researchers asked pilots to recall “pilot 
error” incidents 
– Many “errors” reflected poor cockpit design 
– Results led to standardized cockpit design in modern 
aircraft 
 
 
Major accident 1 
Minor accidents 10 
Reportable incidents 30 
Minor events 600 
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The Current Study 
• Goal: Examine the feasibility of a method to collect 
the operational experiences of UAS pilots  
– Information will be used to identify needed 
improvements in control station design, procedures, 
training, etc    
• Will provide independent and complimentary data 
to supplement NASA simulations and flight tests  
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Approach 
• Focus groups with 2 UAS pilots at a time 
• Participants asked to recall events that they have 
experienced while operating a UAS 
1. A hazardous situation or error 
- Could be about the design of the system, procedures, 
communication, or other issue  
2. A situation where a hazardous situation or error was 
identified and rectified 
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Approach 
• Participant identities remain confidential  
• De-identified incident reports will be made public 
• Approximately 40 incidents so far 
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Manage 
Plan for normal and non-
normal conditions 
Make decisions in normal 
conditions 
Recognize and respond 
to non-normal conditions 
Handoff control 
Aviate 
Monitor and control aircraft 
systems, including automation 
Monitor consumable resources 
Monitor and configure control 
station 
Collision avoidance maneuver  
to avoid aircraft or terrain 
Monitor and control status of 
links 
Navigate 
Control and monitor location and 
flight path of aircraft 
Remain clear of terrain, airspace 
boundaries and weather 
Self-separate from other aircraft 
Ensure that lost link procedure is 
appropriate as flight progresses 
Terminate flight 
Communicate 
Communicate with ATC 
Communicate with other 
airspace users 
Communicate with other flight 
crew or ground support 
Communicate with ancillary 
services (e.g. weather) 
Possible Phases for Critical Events 
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Examples of Emerging Issues 
• Managing lost link procedures 
“We sent the aircraft to a practice area that had terrain. This terrain would affect our 
line-of-sight LOS communications, and at one point the aircraft descended below the 
terrain and we lost link. The aircraft started to fly its lost link procedure, which had the 
aircraft fly towards a predetermined area, which was on the other side of the terrain. 
The aircraft turned towards this area, which had the aircraft flying straight for the 
terrain. The aircraft flew past a ‘gap’ in the mountain range and luckily LOS was re-
established allowing a new (and better) emergency mission to be sent to the aircraft… 
Just in case it lost link again”. 
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• Skill-based errors and muscle memory 
“I turned the SAS [Stability Augmentation System] off by accident. 
We use the emergency red button to turn the SAS off, and we do 
this during normal operations when the ground crew remove the 
chocks. We do this to make sure the ground crew do not get hit if 
the SAS moves a flight control surface. I had developed muscle 
memory with the activation of the SAS disengagement button. 
One day I was flying and I went to put the gear down, but instead I 
turned the SAS off using the red emergency button. The aircraft 
went into a 20-degree bank and 5-degrees nose down. I was able 
to recover the airplane. Now, the procedure is to turn off the SAS 
using the ..(keyboard).. instead of using the red button.  
Examples of Emerging Issues 
• Handover 
“During preflight, handover checks were being done (this is normally accomplished by 
maintenance crews) to see if the radio handovers between the LRE [Launch and 
Recovery Element] and MCE [Mission Control Element] worked before we took off. 
This handover is not routinely done by pilots on the ground –it’s usually done in the 
air. When the handover is done in flight, the procedure is for the MCE to have power 
set to 80%. At the LRE we had the aircraft engine at idle with the parking brake set, 
but when the radio handover switched to MCE, he didn’t have the parking brake set 
and the power was set at 80% (airborne handover settings).  The result was the engine 
revving up, and the aircraft jumping its chocks”.  
 
• Mixing of payload and flight controls 
“The …(Ground Control Station)...allowed some flexibility with assigning buttons to do 
certain functions. There is a button for parachutes. On this mission with a 300 lb fixed 
wing UA, we wanted to map the parachute drop button to a payload ...(function). The 
button still says “parachute drop” but it was for the payload cycle. During a pilot 
proficiency check, we found that hitting the parachute drop button also shuts off the 
engine. The pilot was able to goose it out of idle, and fly it out of a dive. The engine 
was brought to min idle but not actually to off. Not knowing the “behind the panel 
features” affected outcome”. 
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Examples of Emerging Issues 
• Camera view illusions 
“Depending on how I do the landing …. (the moveable sensor camera) …will be used 
to make sure that we clear the turns. But sometimes, the sensor operator will move 
the  camera, which will make it look like that I’m turning but I’m actually not turning. 
So I have to concentrate and make sure I don’t respond to that erroneous camera 
view”. 
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Conclusions and Next Steps 
• UAS pilots are willing to share their experience  
• Incident reports can help to identify topics for 
future research 
• Results will be used to inform  
– Design guidelines 
– Input to FAA & ICAO 
– Incident reporting systems 
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